Though Lyotard did not often cite Heidegger directly as a source or inspiration, at least prior to Heidegger et "les juifs," I believe my interpretation to be highly plausible for three reasons. First, what primary textual evidence there is, most notably in Le Différend, is highly favourable to the argument I will construct. Secondly, Lyotard's intellectual context was awash in Heideggerian influence, and he undoubtedly imbibed a certain amount of Heideggerianism indirectly, for example via Levinas 1 and Derrida, whose earlier post-Heideggerian philosophy I will briefly discuss. Indeed, as Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut have argued persuasively (if polemically), Lyotard's generation of radical French philosophers -those whose thought they lump under the label "la pensée 68" -can be broadly characterized by their radicalization of the antihumanisms of several German thinkers (among which Heidegger is certainly counted). 
Heideggerian Antihumanism and its Ontological Basis
Let us begin by considering Heidegger's "fundamental ontology," 3 specifically with respect to the human being, as expressed in the "Letter on 'Humanism'." For Heidegger, Being, 4 as such, is basic: it is transcendent to all particular beings, it is "the transcendens pure and simple." 5 The essence of the human being is thus its relation to Being; 6 specifically, "the human being essentially occurs in his essence only where he is claimed by [B] eing." 7 More specifically still, human beings are the particular beings for whom Being, as such, is a truth (or, to the extent that the human has "fallen" and forgotten Being, and this is Heidegger's concern, a question to be posed). 8 This is to say that human beings stand in (more accurately, they are) a place or region 9 of Being that is "clear" (i.e. they stand in, or rather are, the "clearing of Being"). 10 The clearing of being, however, is "clear" not simply for human beings as such (i.e. as particular beings), but in the more basic sense that in the clearing, Being is clear to itself; in a manner of speaking, "the clearing itself is [B]eing."
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It is, in any case, Being as transcendens (and not human beings, properly speaking) that "clears" the clearing. Hence human beings have a special place among beings, but only in the sense that Being poses the truth or the question of itself as or through them.
12 Human beings, in Heidegger's picture, therefore have a special destiny 13 and thus a special dignity 14 not shared by such beings as animals, rocks and trees. Their destiny, and their dignity, specifically, is to be the "shepherd" of Being
15
; more precisely, to be the region of Being that poses the question of Being and thereby guards Though imbued with a special dignity, the human is something of a vassal, charged in its essence with the care of Being, 17 moreover, it "does not set the humanitas of the human being high enough" and therefore fails to grasp "the proper dignity of the human being." 26 Heidegger, by contrast, claims to approach the question of human essence and human dignity by way of a proper assessment of metaphysics and an engagement in the fundamental question of Being that metaphysics forgets, covers over, or simply does not pose.
It is crucial to note that for Heidegger, the standing-in-the-clearing-ofBeing proper to human beings is language. Not language as a tool or medium of communication; rather, language in its essential relation to Being. 27 Here is how he puts it: "In its essence, language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing. Nor can it ever be thought in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character, perhaps not even in terms of the character of signification. Put differently, thinking and saying are the work of Being manifesting itself (to itself, as human being), and guarding against its forgetting (by itself, as human being). The particular way in which human beings are always already preceded by Being is inescapably tied to language, in its essential dimension; as we saw, language is "the home of the human being's essence."
31 Hence, for Heidegger the human being "has" language in only a strictly metaphorical sense. 
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Heidegger treats this question of language specifically in a later text, "On the Question of Being." There we see more of the properly philological dimension of his philosophical project; Heidegger submits even the term "Being," insofar as we inherit it from a language degraded by metaphysics, to a radical questioning (going so far as to cross out the term whenever he must use it).
35 As Spivak notes in her preface to Derrida's Of Grammatology, "On the Question of Being" is considered by Derrida, a contemporary and philosophical fellow-traveller of Lyotard, to be the "authority" for his own practice of "writing under erasure" (i.e. crossing out certain terms to indicate that they are inadequate, but, given the state of language, necessary).
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Derrida maintains however that despite what he perceives as Heidegger's attempt to "free language from the fallacy of a fixed origin," he still sets Being up as a transcendental signified, a signified to which all languages ultimately refer, and on top of that accords the human being a special relation to that signified. 37 Heidegger's, then, is not a thoroughgoing antihumanism. In Derrida's words: 42 One can certainly read into this a description of Lyotard's Nanterre writings, and a prescient characterization of Économie libidinale, Lyotard's most uncompromisingly radical, antihumanistic and ethically aporetic text. Derrida nonetheless notes that this irruptive method has its own pitfalls: ordinary language "ceaselessly reinstates the new terrain on the oldest ground," and such a "displacement" can lead one to unwittingly inhabit "the inside one declares one has deserted." 43 In practical terms, one thinks here of how the revolt of 68 largely played itself out as a flexible regime of capital accumulation and a shallow culture of consumerism, hedonism, and aestheticism. 44 As such, Lyotard the libidinal economist's injunction to "be in inside and forget it" 45 can be flagged as highly problematic; indeed, as Lyotard later admits, Économie libidinale delivers nothing less than a "politics of capital," an "accelerationist" rather than properly revolutionary philosophy.
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Lyotardian Antihumanism and its Heideggerian Inspiration
More could be said here about Derrida's critical appropriation of Heidegger, but for my purposes the main thing to note is the following: in the linguistic turn which followed the libidinal phase of his thinking, Lyotard adopts something very close to this roughly sketched critical appropriation of Heidegger. While like Heidegger, he searches for something in or about language which is "always already before" human speech and human beings, he attempts, like Derrida, not to succumb to the temptation to render language nihilating-transcendent or to retain some special, dignified place for humanity. Lyotard's antihumanism following the libidinal philosophy is therefore in this respect, like Derrida's, a radicalization of Heidegger's. It is also highly idiosyncratic in some of its specifics. At this stage I will note its most general outlines, with respect to both the similarities to and the departures from its Heideggerian matrix.
It is worth pausing however to inquire why philosophers like Lyotard and Derrida would attack humanism, even going so far as to purge Heidegger's nominally antihumanistic philosophy of the destiny and dignity he accorded humanity. In quite general terms, their line of attack stems from the Nietzschean critique of the nihilism which dominates Western philosophy, in particular the notion that transcendent concepts nihilate concrete particulars. Quite simply: because it is a transcendent concept, "Humanity" may be invoked to justify all manner of atrocities aimed at individual human beings. Therefore humanism is pernicious and a truly radical philosophy will have gotten beyond it. But this raises the problem of how a contemporary, post-religious philosophy which jettisons humanism may articulate an ethics. In the wake of May 68 and the early 1970s, the efforts of Lyotard and Derrida may be broadly interpreted as a sustained engagement with this question. In this connection their considerable debt to Levinas should also be noted.
These considerations shed light on why, following the ethically aporetic libidinal phase of his thinking, Lyotard attempted to think an ethical antihumanism. In the process he all but abandoned Freud's pulsional theory and turned to language pragmatics as his primary material. 47 Granted, to the extent that language pragmatics evokes images of human beings communicating and creating certain other linguistic effects, this may seem hard to square with an antihumanist project. Lyotard attempts nonetheless to pull off a thoroughly antihumanist linguistic turn. He seeks an understanding of language pragmatics which degrades the conceptual position of the human as such, a linguistic "revolution of relativity and of quantum theory," as he puts it. 48 Lyotard casts language in such a way that human beings are no longer in command of it, as "language users," or at the centre of it, as originators or privileged loci of discourse. This will come as a surprise to readers who know Lyotard through his most popular text, The Postmodern Condition, wherein he freely employs the later Wittgenstein's notion of language games to describe the social bond. The later Lyotard purifies his terms of humanist residues, insisting that "[y]ou don't play around with language … [a]nd in this sense, there are no language games." 49 Rather, he conceives of language as a kind of primal but unstable material preceding, structuring and, in a sense, generating human beings. Language pragmatics, far from simply denoting the ways humans do things with words, is re-construed as the way in which language, radically heterogeneous with respect to itself but also always already prior to the human, does things or produces certain effects with humans. But as we will see, Lyotard does not view humans as an essential component of language pragmatics; they possess no "destiny" in Heidegger's sense.
This stems from Lyotard's beginning to view the pragmatic dimension of language as a question of ontology or, better perhaps, Being-generatingtime, or Being-coming-into-being, i.e. occurrence, as and at the behest of Being: what Heidegger calls Ereignis, Being itself as "propriating event," an event which gathers Being to itself and clears it to itself (some Anglophone commentators speak of Ereignis as "en-owning"); Being as pure "there is" or "it gives"). 50 In Le Différend Lyotard interprets language in more or less Heideggerian fashion, appropriating the latter's terms. Language is now Being, but not quite in the sense of transcendens pure and simple; it is rather Being, in and generating time. Language is now viewed, in other words, in terms of the event: Heidegger's Ereignis, the "event of propriation." Language/Being is, then, for Lyotard a phrasing, the pure "it happens," and this entails not Being as a stable, pre-existent, transcendent structure structuring the human linguistically, but rather, as he puts it in Le Différend, "one being, one time," every time. 51 For Lyotard, this means that "language"
is not simply the natural human language spoken by you and me; rather, it is any and every event, insofar as every event is a kind of phrasing.
When a phrase happens, it presents at least one "universe." 52 A universe is a concatenation or "situation" 53 of four pragmatic poles: referent ("what it is about, the case"), sense ("what is signified about the case"), addressee ("that to which or addressed to which this is signified about the case"), and addressor ("that 'through' which or in the name of which this is signified about the case"). 54 A universe is distinguished by how its four poles are situated: "The disposition of a phrase universe consists in the situating of these instances in relation to each other. A phrase may entail several referents, several senses, several addressees, several addressors. Each of these four instances may be marked [i.e. clearly indicated, or filled in by something definite] in the phrase or not."
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A phrase presents a situation; it cannot, however, present its own presentation, which is to say, its presentation is not itself situated in the universe it presents. 56 The presentation of a phrase may nonetheless be marked in the universe it presents by There is (il y a) ; since ordinary language can refer to itself, a phrase like "There is a presentation in the current phrase" marks it, but does not strictly speaking present or situate it. The presentation entailed by a given phrase, however, may be situated in the universe of another phrase. 57 This is to say that when a phrase occurs, there is what it presents (ce qu'il y a), as well as that it presents (qu'il y a); the latter may be vaguely indicated in the phrase, but it can only be situated in another phrase (i.e. the fact that the phrase presented something becomes a referent in another phrase). The il y a is the phrase in its most ontological dimension, and we should guard against restricting the concept of "phrase" to natural language. Any event may be described in these terms, since any event situates the four pragmatic poles described above.
At this point it should be clear why Lyotard's philosophy of phrases may be plausibly interpreted in terms of the ontological/linguistic dimension of Heidegger's philosophy. But here we can ask whether for Lyotard, as for Heidegger, human beings constitute a particular, privileged "region" or "clearing" of Being. To the extent that they are addressees of the fact that Being, as event, "speaks" or rather phrases to them, they are "called" by Being, if not to "think Being" in the specifically Heideggerian sense, then at least to respond to the event. But more fundamentally, as we will see, before it can be said that they are called by Being, to respond or otherwise, human beings are called into being by Being, which is to say they are called into being by the event. As with Heidegger, human beings are for Lyotard transcended by Being; Lyotard interprets Being, however, as pure event. Hence, while it appears that he has abandoned or compromised what I would argue is his nearly career-long struggle against nihilating transcendence, Lyotard is really saying -not without inconsistency, which is immediately obvious -that singularity is, precisely, what is transcendent (and hence, singularity is still privileged), even to the extent that it is the transcendent condition of transcendence itself.
Where Lyotard departs from Heidegger is with respect to the notion that the human being is the shepherd of Being, the region of Being destined/dignified to pose the question of Being and thereby to open itself to Being's dispensation and guard against its forgetting. In fact, questions of calling or destiny are absent from Lyotard's account of Ereignis as bare occurrence; inasmuch as each event can be characterized by both a presentation and a situation, such questions are "situational," i.e. they are of the order of what is presented by the event (ce qu'il y a) but they are not of the event (qu'il y a), strictly speaking. In Lyotard's estimation: [Heidegger] persists in making 'man' the addressee of the giving which in Ereignis gives, and gives itself while withholding itself, and [he] particularly persists in making in making the one who receives this giving into the man who fulfills his destiny as man by hearing the authenticity of time. Destiny, addressee, addressor, and man are instances or relations here in universes presented by phrases [i.e. events], they are situational, tô logo. The There is takes place, it is an occurrence (Ereignis), but it does not present anything to anyone, it does not present itself, and it is not the present, nor is it presence. Insofar as it is phrasable (thinkable), a presentation falls short 58 as an occurrence.
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As Bennington interprets this passage, "Lyotard distinguishes his thinking about time from the later Heidegger on the Ereignis on the grounds that the latter still thinks time in terms of gift and destination, i.e. in terms of instances situated within a presented phrase-universe, rather than as the bare 'occurrence' of the event of presentation of that universe." 60 As bare occurrence, Being does not give itself (as question, or clearing, or event) to the human being, without generating or having generated the human being by situating it pragmatically as either addressor, addressee, sense, or referent. In fact, the formulation of Ereignis as "there is / it gives" is already too loaded: it is for Lyotard, simply, a matter of the "there is," the il y a or "il arrive." As he puts it, "[p]resentation is not an act of giving (and above all not one coming from some Es, or some It addressed to some us, to us human beings)." 61 Being is the pure "it happens." 62 This does not entail a stable, pre-existent, transcendent structure, structuring by "donations" or "sendings" the human being as/via language. It entails, rather, Being in terms of the particular phrase or utterance: i.e. "one being, one time," every time.
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This being the case, it is only sometimes true that a human being is called into being when Being, the event, happens; the presentation entailed by the event is not necessarily a presentation to a human being or human beings (or for that matter, a presentation from them or by them), nor is it necessarily a generation of the human being. The seemingly anthropocentric pragmatic poles of addressee and addressor of the event, Lyotard suggests, may be fulfilled by virtually any being. 64 His account of the onto-logic of the event apparently leaves no special role for human beings as such. This is to say that whereas there is a technically antihumanist account of a particularly human destiny for Heidegger, there is none for Lyotard; there is only what appears to be a thoroughgoing antihumanism.
If I have been successful in my reconstruction, then the homology with Heidegger and the nature of Lyotard's radicalization will have both become clear. I also believe that my reconstruction opens at least two more paths of inquiry which I will have to merely indicate and not follow here: one onto the question of the extent to which Heidegger's critique of the essence of technology influenced Lyotard's critique of capitalism and technoscientific development, and one onto the question of the extent to which Heidegger's fundamental ontology generated his later political attentisme and subsequently influenced Lyotard's own. 65 It is my suspicion that Lyotard, one-time Left-Marxist militant, imbibed something of a poison pill in turning to the resources of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. For the later Heidegger there is no other calling for the human being than to clear the ground for thinking, to think, and to await in one's thinking the dispensation of Being. For the later Lyotard, there is no other human project but to testify to the incompleteness and dissonance of the human itself, and all that remains of politics is the bearing witness to the event. It is my suspicion that not just the ontology, but also the melancholy of the later Lyotard has its roots in Heidegger. being, e.g. a lamp) and das Sein (the "to be" of a particular being; e.g. that which is or accounts for the be-ing of the lamp). The clarity of English renderings of
Heidegger may suffer where this fundamental difference is not worded correctly;
